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Abstract
Rising oil prices appear to retard aggregate US. economic activity by more than falling oil prices
stimulate it. Past research suggests adjustment costs and/or monetary policy may bepossible
explanations ofthe asymmetric response. This paper uses a quasi-vector autoregressive model of
US. economy to examine from where the asymmetry might originate. The analysis uses
counterfactual impulse response experiments to determine thatmonetary policy alone cannot
account for the asymmetry. The robustness ofshort-lived asymmetry across the base case and
counterfactuals is consistent with the adjustment-cost explanation.
1. Introduction
Rising oil prices appear to retard aggregate US. economic activity by more than falling oil
prices stimulate it. All but one ofthe post World War II recessions have followed a sharp rise in
oil prices. Yet, an acceleration ofUS. economic activity did not seem to follow the oil price
declines that have occurred overthe past two decades.
Over the past decade, a number ofstudies (Mork 1989, Mory 1993, Mork 1994, Lee et al.
1995, Hamilton 1996, Huntington 1998, Davis and Haltiwanger 1998, and Hamilton and Herrera
1999) have investigated and confirmed an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and
aggregate economic activity. Although asymmetry is now fairly well accepted, few studies have
attempted to determine through what channels oil price shocks travel to produce an asymmetric
response in aggregate economic activity. One exception is Huntington (1998) who attributes the
asymmetry to therelationship between crude oil and petroleum product prices.
Hamilton (1988) offers an explanation that asymmetry could be the result ofadjustment
costs to changing oil prices. Falling oil prices stimulate economic activity, and rising oil prices2
retard economic activity, butthe costs ofadjusting to changing oil prices also retard economic
activity. Combining these elements, we see that rising oil prices would present two negative
effects for economic activity. Falling oil prices would present both a negative and a positive effect
which would tend tobe offsetting. Empirical work by Loungani (1986), Davis (1987), Lee et aI.
(1995), Davis and Haltiwanger (1998), and Hamilton and Herrera (1999) supports but does not
directly testHamilton's explanation.
Another possibility is that monetary policy may account for the asymmetric response of
aggregate economic activity. Bohi (1989, 1991) and Bemanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) argue
that contractionary monetary policy accounts for the decline in aggregate economic activity
following an oil price increase. Neither explore the asymmetry issue explicitly. Tatom (1988,
1993) argues thatthe apparent asymmetric response in U.S. economic activity to oil price shocks
disappears when the stance ofmonetary policy or changes in the misery index (which combines
unemployment and inflation rates) are taken into account.
Inthis paper, we examine asymmetry first with a bivariate time-series model, then with a
multivariate model ofU.S. economic activity. In the bivariate model, we find that GDP responds
asymmetrically to oil price movements. With the multivariate model, we find that asymmetry is
present not only in the GDP response, but also in the interest-rate response to oil price shocks.
To analyze whether ornot asymmetric monetary policy is the source ofasymmetry, we perform
several counterfactual experiments. We show asymmetry is transmitted through market interest
rates to GDP, and monetary policy cannot bethe sole source ofasymmetry in the real economy.3
2. A BivariateExamination ofAsymmetry
The measured effect ofoil price movements on economic activity can be sensitive to the
choice ofthe oil variable used in the analysis. Using nominal oil prices, Hamilton (1983) showed
that oil price increases were associated with declines in output in the period 1948-1980. When
the sample is extended to the 1980s or 90s, however, the oil-output relationship seems to break
down (see Mork 1989 and Hooker 1996).
Researchers have tried many different oil-price specifications in an attempt to reestablish
the oil-output relationship (Mork 1989, Ferderer 1996, Lee et al. 1995). In particular, Hamilton
(1996 and 1999) proposes a "net oil price" variable which compares the price ofoil each quarter
with themaximum value observed during the preceding year. Ifthe values for the current quarter
exceeds the previous year's maximum, the percentage change overthe previous year's maximum
is the oil-price value. Ifthe price ofoil in quarter t is lower than it had been at some point during
the previous year, the series is defined to be zero for date t. Hamilton found that the "net oil
price" variable had a statistically significant and stable negative relationship with output.
As a first step in our analysis, weutilize bivariate tests to determine whether real output
and the price level respond asymmetrically or symmetrically to oil price movements. In these
tests, we utilize two representations ofoil price movements. One representation is simply the first
difference of(logged) oil prices (~Poil). A second representation is the Hamilton net oil price
described above (Hoil).1 Taken together thesetwo oil price series allow for either symmetry or
asymmetry in the response to oil price shocks. This allowance may be particularly critical because
Huntington (1998) finds that overall consumer prices may respond symmetrically to oil price
changes.4
The bivariate tests indicate that real U.S. GOP responds asymmetrically to oil price
movements, but the U.S. GOP deflator responds symmetrically as illustrated in Table l.
Consistent with Hooker (1996), wefind that changes in oil prices alone have no significant affect
on real U.S. GOP, while the Hamilton net oil price taken alone is significant with greater than 95
percent confidence. The pattern doesn't change ifboth oil price variables are used on the right
hand side ofthe GOP equation. The Hamilton oil price variable remains significant and the
change in oil price variable remains insignificant
2
Forthe GDP deflator, the change in oil price variable by itselfbecomes highly significant.
and the Hamilton net oil price taken alone also remains significant. When both oil price variables
are used onthe right hand side ofthe GOP deflator equation, changes in oil prices remain
significant while Hamilton net oil price becomes insignificant.
3
3. A Multivariate Examination ofAsymmetry
3.1. Data and Model
To betterunderstand the nature ofthe asymmetric relationship between oil prices and
economic activity, we examine this relationship within the context ofa multivariate time series
model. Wetake as our point ofdeparture the analysis ofBemanke, Gertler and Watson
(hereafter BGW) who also used a multivariate model to assess the importance ofoil price shocks
on economic activity. BGW estimate a quasi-VARwith log output, log price level, a (log)
commodity price index, theHamilton oil price variable, the fed-funds rate, a short terminterest
rate (3 month t-bill) and a long term rate (lO year t-bond). They break their system into three
sub-blocks ofequations: a macro block, a policy block, and financial block. The macro block5
includes equations for output, aggregate price level, commodity prices, and oil price variable.
Current and lagged values ofthe fed funds rate do not enter directly into the macro block and,
hence, are absent from the output, price level, commodity price, and oil price equations while only
lagged values ofotherthe interest ratevariables enter into the macro block equations. The
contemporaneous causal ordering inside the macro block runs output, price level, commodity
price, and finally oil prices. The policy block consists ofan equation for the fed funds rate
capturing the systematic response ofmonetary policy to the economic environment. This
equation includes current and lagged values ofall the variables in the macro block, but only
lagged values ofshort and long term interest rates. Finally, the financial block consists ofthe
short term and long terminterest rate equations. These equations contain current and lagged
values ofthe other variables including the fed funds rate and lagged values oftheinterest rates
with the long rate equation also containing current values ofthe short term interest rate. Given
this structure, BGW found that once one controls for the systematic response ofmonetary policy
oil price increases have only small effects on output.
The original BGW specification is notentirely suitable for our examinationofasymmetry
and as a result we modi!)' the BGW model in several ways. First, along with the Hamilton oil
price variable, we include lags ofthe change in the (log) oil price in every equation. Unlike the
original BGW specification, this allows for either a symmetric orasymmetric response to oil price
changes (symmetricifcoefficients on the Hamilton variable are zero). Second, we replace the
Hamilton oil price as a dependent variable in the system withjust the change in (log) oil price.
Including the change in oil prices allows us to examine both positive and negative innovations.
Furthermore, an innovation in the change in the price ofoil is much easier to interpret than an6
innovation in a Hamilton oil price variable-it is not at all clear how to interpret a negative
Hamilton innovation. Finally, we add an identity to the system that essentially defines the
Hamilton oil price variable. The resulting model is a nonlinear system ofequations with seven
linear, estimated equations and one nonlinear identity. This system allows for nonlinear dynamics
including asymmetric responses to oil price shocks.
Like BGWweuse monthly data, spanning the period from January 1965 through
December 1997. GDP is in constant 1987 dollars, with monthly GDP and GDP price deflator
interpolated from quarterly data' Our specification differs in that weuse the raw values oflog
output and long-term interest rates rather than the spline detrended va1ues used in BGW. The
commodity price index is the spot market index for all commodities from the Commodity
Research Bureau, used by BGW. The oil price is the Crude Oil PPI from Citibase. Thefederal
funds rate, thethree-month treasury bill rate and the ten-year treasury bond rate series are all from
Citibase.
3.2 NonlinearImpulse Response Analysis
One way to assess the degree to which asymmetry is present in the multivariate model is
to conduct impulse response analysis. Because ofthe nonlinear nature ofthe model, impulse
response functions (IRFs) must be calculated with care. Recall that anIRF is the change in
conditional expectations, given an exogenous shock, U, and the current information set, Q'_I> or:
E[Yt+klu" Qt-I] - E[Yt+kPt_l]·
In a linear VAR, the change in conditional expectation is a linear function ofthe underlying shock
and does not depend onthe initial conditions. Ina nonlinear model, that is generally notthe case.7
Therefore, in orderto calculate the conditional expectation, bothwith and without the exogenous
shock, we simulate the modeL This is done by drawing shocks for ~+i (from resampled empirical
shocks) and simulating the model given the initial condition (Qt-') and the original shock~. We
also simulate the model with for -~+i so that we can eliminate any asymmetry that may arisejust
from sampling variation in the estimation ofthe conditional expectations. We repeat this 100
times and take the average overthe simulations to get an estimate ofthe conditional expectation.
This was done for 100 randomly drawn (from the actual sample) initial conditions, and the
resulting IRFs were averaged.
Figures I and 2 plot the average (over initial conditions) IRFs. for +/- 1 and 2 standard
deviation shocks, respectively. Fromthe Figures we see evidence ofasymmetry; that is, positive
and negative shocks are not mirror images ofone another. However, the asymmetry is more
evident in large (two standard deviation) shocks thanin smaller shocks (one standard deviation
shocks). The reason is that smaller shocks, even positive ones, are less likely to show up as
affecting the Hamilton oil price variable. In addition, the degree ofasymmetry is generally larger
in the short run than in the long run. This is due, in part, to the fact that oil price shocks generally
have only temporary effects onthe Hamilton oil price variable; thus, the asymmetry originating in
the oil-price impulses are relatively short-lived.
With respect to individual variables, we see that the output response is asymmetric for
large changes in oil prices-both negative and positive shocks are associated with declines in
output. Only after 10 periods does the output response become positive for large declines in the
price ofoiL Thus, oil price decreases do not have as large an expansionary effect on economic
activity as oil price increases have a contractionary effect.8
The responses ofprices (both the GDP deflator and commodity price index) also appear to
be asymmetric, albeit less so than output. Here, prices tend to respond more to a large oil price
increase than they do to a large oil price decrease. Similarly, thefed-funds rate has a very
asymmetric response to oil price shocks--the fed-funds rate rises much more in response to a large
positive oil price shock than it does to a large negative oil price shock. In fact, the response is
twice as large for a positive as for a negative oil price shock. Short-term interest rates also
respond asymmetrically to oil price shocks, while long rates respond more symmetrically.
An alternative way to view whether the responses are asymmetric is to examine the sum of
the responses to a positive and negative two standard deviation oil pri,ce shock. Ifthe responses
are symmetric, then this sum would be zero. To assess the precision with which the apparent
asymmetry is estimated, we calculate the inner 90% percentile band for the distribution ofthe sum
ofresponses, 5 The point estimates as well as the 5th and 95thpercentiles ofthe sumofthe
responses are shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 illustrates the substantial asymmetry in the responses
to oil price shocks in thatthe sum ofthe responses are frequently nonzero. Foroutput, the price
level, the fed funds rate, and the 3 montht-bill rate there are horizons in which the inner 90%
percentile band does not include zero, suggesting thatthe evidence ofasymmetry is not entirely
the result ofan imprecisely estimated parameter vector. This is despite that fact that impulse
response functions for VARs aretypically imprecisely estimated,
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4. Where Does theAsymmetry Originate?
The negative output response to negative oil shocks in the very short run is somewhat
surprising, although Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) also found a slightly negative response of9
employment to negative oil price shocks. While there is little controversy that oil prices in
principle can have a direct effect on economic activity as oil is an important input, it is not at all
clear that this would imply an asymmetric effect. Perhaps, reallocation costs either across or
within sectors might result in a negative response. For example, for putty-clay capital with energy
intensity embodied in the vintage ofcapital a change in oil prices may have negative output
consequences as firms adjust to new energy prices (see Atkeson and Kehoe 1999).
Itis not only output, but also interest rates that respond asymmetrically to oil price shocks
however. Judging from the reaction ofthe fed-funds rate, the Fed responds more vigorously to
oil price increases than to decreases. The asymmetric response ofthe fed-funds rate then feeds
through interest rates and results in the asymmetric response in output. In a traditional aggregate
demand/supply model, increases in oil prices implies an unpleasant choice ofpolicy responses by
the Fed. It can accommodate an oil price increase by raising aggregate demand and lessen the
negative effect on output but at the cost ofhigher prices, or it can reduce aggregate demand and
lessen the price effect but at the cost oflower output. From the responses, it appears that the Fed
is less willing to accommodate oil price increases than oil price declines.
In addition to fed-funds rate, the short-term interest rate response also suggests
substantial asymmetry. One explanation is that the asymmetric response ofshort-term market
rates is just a reflection ofthe asymmetric response ofthe fed-funds rate through the term
structure. Alternatively, the interest rates may be reflecting the financial markets' expectations of
the "real" effect ofoil price changes. Thirdly, they may reflect increased financial stress brought
about by oil price shock. For example, in the "financial accelerator" model ofBernanke and
Gertler (1989), an adverse shock increases the likelihood ofbankruptcy and default on loans,10
raising the costs ofexternal finance, making it more difficult for firms to obtain loans from
financial intermediaries. This results in a "flight to quality" with credit worthy firms being able to
go to the commercial paper market while other firms would see the cost ofexternal financing rise.
As a first pass at evaluating these alternative explanations ofasymmetry, wetest to
detennine whether it is possible to exclude the oil price variables from individual equations. Table
2 illustrates the results ofthe exclusion tests. For all the macro block variables (output, price
level, commodity price index) neither the oil price nor the Hamilton oil price variable are
statistically significant (this holds true ifwe included current values ofthe oil and Hamilton oil
price variable into the regressions). On the other hand, the Hamilton pil price variable was
significant in the fed-funds equation and the short-rate equation and was marginally significant in
the long-rate equation. This suggests that the effect ofoil prices on output is reflected primarily
through interest rates, which are significant in the output equation.
4.1 Two Counter-Factual Experiments
BGW argue thatthe systematic response ofmonetary policy to oil price shocks is
responsible for much ofthe response ofoutput to oil price shocks. To determine the degree to
whichthe systematic response ofthe Federal Reserve is responsible for the asymmetry, we
conduct the same type ofcounter factual policy experiments as in BGW. Essentially, we shut
down the response ofthefed-funds rate to an oil price shock, so that the fed-funds rate is
unchanged as a result ofan oil price shock. By comparing these impulse responses with those of
the baseline case, we get a sense ofthe Fed's contribution to the asymmetric response ofoutput.
We conduct two such counter-factual experiments. In the Sims-Zha experiment the fed-funds11
rate is held constant in the face ofoil price shock, but no attempt is made to allow for the effect of
expectations offuture fed-funds rates on other interest rates. The second experiment assumes
that the constant fed-funds rate is credibly embodied in the markets' expectations offuture fed-
funds rates and that this expectation affects current short and long-term rates through the term
structureofinterest rates (the anticipated policy) .7
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the Sims-Zha and anticipated policy experiments with two-
standard deviation positive and negative oil shocks. The output and short-term interest rate
responses are clearly asymmetric in the Sims-Zha case, with a slightly asymmetric response in the
commodity price variable. This suggests that oil price changes have l!'1 asymmetric effect evenif
the fed-funds rate is unchanged. Note also that decreases in the price ofoil result in an initial
decrease in output as in the base case but this is exacerbatedifthefed-funds rate is kept at its
original level (instead offalling as in the base case). Not letting thefederal funds rate fall maybe
interpreted as tighter monetary policy than in the base case, leading to a contraction in output.
When we control for expectations offuture fed-funds rates we continue to see asymmetric
responses in boththe macro and financial blocks. Although somewhat more muted, there is
asymmetry in the responses ofoutput, commodity price index and short-term interest rates. The
long-rate response is also substantially asymmetric.
The fact that we see an asymmetric effect ofoil even when we control for expectations of
future fed-funds rate suggests that monetary policy is not solely responsible for these effects.
Recall from the exclusion tests that oil appears to have no direct effect on the variables in the
macro block. Even after controlling for the systematic response ofthe fed funds rate, we stilI see
an asymmetric response in interest rates. This suggests that the term premia onthe interest rates12
also responds asymmetrically. Infact, exclusion tests for estimated term premia support this fact
as the oil price variables are significant for both the short and long-term premia (see Table 3).
4.2 Commercial paper! t-biU spread and theflight to quality
Becausethe effect ofoil prices on output seems to be working through interest rates, we
examine whetherthis result is robust for an alternative interest rates series. Specifically, we
replace thelong and shortrates used in theBGW specification with the 6 month T-Bill and the
spread between the 4-6 month commercial paper and the 6 month T-Bill (the CPBILL spread).
That is, we replace the term-interest-rate relationship with a "quality" spread relationship. One
advantage ofexamining commercial paper! t-bill spread is that this variable has been argued to
reflect "flight to quality" in financial markets (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996).
When we repeat the exclusion tests with the "quality spread" we still find that oil variables
are not significant in the macro block equations, butthat interest rates, particularly the CPBILL
spread, are significant, especially in the output equation (see Table 4). The current and lagged
values ofthe Hamilton oil variable, however, have a significant effect onthe quality spread as well
as onthe fed-funds rate.
The impulse responses from the CPBILL model exhibit strong asymmetry. As can be seen
in Figure 6, the response ofoutput to oil price shocks for the first 9 periods is nearly identical
regardless ofoil prices going up or down. At longer horizons, the responses become more
symmetric. We see strong asymmetry for fed funds, 6-month t-bill, and the spread between
commercial paper and t-bill rates. Large increases in the price ofoil raise the quality spread more
than decreases in the price ofoil decrease the quality spread, by almost three times as much.13
Figure 7 shows the sum ofthe responses to positive and negative oil shocks along with the inner
90% band ofthe distribution ofresponses. As can be seen, the point estimates ofthe sum for
GDP, the short rates and the quality spread responses are often well outside the 90% band again
suggesting that the estimated asymmetry is not entirely due to sampling variation.
Figure 8 and 9 show the base case and the two counter-factual experiments with the
CPBILL model for a 2-standard deviation positive and negative oil price shock. The asymmetric
response remains even after shutting down the fed-funds response. Shutting down the fed-funds
rate response to an oil price increase (decrease) moderates the output response, while the interest-
rate response is greater than in the base case. When we control for fed-funds rates, the response
ofthe commercial paper/t-bill spread is still very asymmetric. Note also that the price responses
are very similar regardless ofwhether the fed-funds rate is allowed to respond ornot, especially in
the short run suggesting a certain sluggishness ofprices in response to movements in the fed funds
rate. Overall, the character ofthe results when a quality spread is used in the analysis is similar to
those using the BGWspecification.
5. Conclusions
Itis clear that negative and positive oil price shocks have asymmetric effects on output
and interest rates. At first consideration, the strong asymmetry we find in output may seem
puzzling, particularly the strikingly similar negative response ofoutput to both positive and
negative oil prices changes in the short run' Mork (1994) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1998)
found substantially similar results for the short run. Suchfindings are consistent with the
explanation that oil price shocks necessitate costly adjustment (either inter-sectoral or intra-14
sectoral as emphasized by Davis and Haltiwanger).
Ourtests also show that oil prices affect interest rates asymmetrically before they affect
output asymmetrically. BGW assert that the real effects ofoil price shocks arise from the Fed's
response to oil price shocks. This may betrue to some extent, butwefind that the asymmetry
does not go away-and is in fact is enhanced-"when eitherthe fed-funds rate orthe fed-funds
rate and expectations ofthe fed-funds rate are shut down. Hence, monetary policy cannot be the
sole cause ofasymmetry onthe real side.
The channel through which oil price shocks affect output in ourmodel is through interest
rates. One cautious interpretation ofthe asymmetry in the interest-rate response is that relatively
fluid market rates move in anticipation ofasymmetric real effects that will be realized later.
Another interpretation is that interest rates are reflecting increased financial stress brought about
by the oil price change, as in the "financial accelerator" models.15








Note: The dependent variable is the variable in the first column onthe left-hand side. The table
represents significance values fromjoint F-tests testing whether the coefficients on all lags ofthe
HOll- and APOll- variables are zero.16
Table 2. Multivariate Exclusion Tests
HOIL LlPOIL HOIL & LlPOIL
GDP 0.82 0.66 0.80
Price Level 0.25 0.95 0.68
Commodity Price 0.27 0.67 0.57
LlPOIL 0.21 0.00 0.00
Fed Funds Rate 0.01 0.92 0.06
Short Rate 0.02 0.49 0.16
Long Rate 0.17 0.96 0.26
Note: The dependent variable is the variable in thefirst column on the left-hand side. The table
represents significance values fromjoint F-tests testing whether the coefficients on all lags ofthe
HaIL and f..POIL variables are zero. Exclusion tests including the contemporaneous values of
the oil variables were also done. The results are very similarto the above values.17
Table 3. Multivariate Exclusion Tests: Short and Long-Run Risk Premia Equations
ROIL ~POIL ROIL & ~POIL
Risk Premium (S) 0.00 om 0.00
Risk Premium (L) 0.00 0.40 0.00
The table represents significance values from joint F-tests testing whether the coefficients on all
lags ofthe HOIL and ~POIL variables are zero. Exclusion tests including the contemporaneous
values ofthe oil variables were also done. The results are very similar to the above values.18
Table 4. Multivariate Exclusion Tests- CPBILL Model
Hoil ~Poil Hoil & ~Poil
GDP 0.77 0.67 0.85
PriceLevel 0.40 0.95 0.80
PCom 0.15 0.50 0.37
~Poil 0.22 0.00 0.00
Fed Funds 0.2 0.92 0.11
T-bill 0.20 0.67 0.43
Spread 0.02 0.67 0.14
Note: The dependent variable is the variable in thefirst column onthe left-hand side. The table
represents significance values from jointF-tests testing whether the coefficients on all lags ofthe
variables in thefirst row are zero. Exclusion tests including the contemporaneous values ofthe
oil variables were also done. The results are very similar tothe above values. Hoil is the
Hamilton oil variable, T-bill is the 6-month treasury bill and the Spread is the spread between
commercial-paper rate and the 6-month t-bill rate.19
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1. Our analysis uses montWy data including a montWy version ofHamilton's net oil price.
2. Wefound the persistence captured in the Hamilton variable to be ofimportance for U.S. GDP.
For example, we also experimented with an oil variable defined as Upoil = Max {0,8Poil}.
Neither Poil, Upoil orPoil and Upoil combined had a significant effect on GDP.
3. Other specifications ofthe symmetry-asymmetry test yielded substantially similar results for the
U.S. GDP Deflator. '
4. Weuse a slightly different set ofinterpolators for GDP and the price deflator. Personal
consumption expenditures, industrial production and total nonagricultural employment are used
for interpolating GDP. The GDP price deflator is interpolated with the following producers' price
indexes to make it montWy: PPI for capital equipment, PPI for finished goods, PPI for
intermediate materials and the PPI for crude materials.
S. The distribution ofthe sum ofresponses is calculated by assuming a posterior distribution for
the parametervectorthat is a normal and whose mean and variance!covariance are that ofthe
estimated parameter vector. We take the size ofthe shocktobe a constant ratherthan a random
variable. The distribution ofresponses are calculated by randomly drawing a parameter vector
from its posterior distribution. We then calculate the average impulse response function over 100
different initial conditions (as described in the text) for the drawn parameter vector and the
distribution ofresponses for 100 parametervector draws. Calculating the distribution ofthe sum
ofresponses requires a total of4xl0
6 simulations ofthe nonlinear system ofequations. The
approach taken here is similar to one ofmethods Hamilton (1994) describes for calculating
confidence intervals for impulse responses.
6. Whenwereplace theHamilton oil variable with the Upoil variable defined in note 2, the
asymmetry is even more pronounced for GDP with zero being well outside the 90% band.
7. To control for the effect ofexpectations offuture fed-funds rates oninterest rates, we follow
BGWby breaking up interest rates into an expectations component and a term premium.
Expectations componentis the average ofcurrent and future fed-funds rates while the term
premium is justthe difference between actual interest rate and the expectations component.
Because ofthe nonlinear nature ofthemodel, wemust simulate themodel in order to calculate22
expectations offuture fed-funds rates.
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